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Funding Michigan K-12
Adequacy Without
Rewarding Inefficiency
James J. Walters
Taxpayers and politicians expect public schools to exercise stewardship and wisdom regarding the use of resources entrusted to them.
These public expectations approximate what economists refer to as
technical efficiency. Technical efficiency emerges from the ideal use of
available resources for maximizing output whereas allocative efficiency
derives from comparing alternative technically efficient systems and
choosing the least costly option.1 A third and more obscure type of
efficiency emerges in economic analysis from an interpretation of the
unobserved effects of the entity studied. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as "x-efficiency." Its significance comes from the
unobserved effects of vision, motivation, incentives, and the culture
of the entity and its leadership.2
Evidence exists that qualitative factors such as clearly defined goals,
uninhibited access to information regarding these goals, incentives,
motivation and effort, often the fruit of competition or adversity, yield
far greater output improvement compared to marginal changes in
inputs.3 Quantity times price may generate a variety of results depending on these unobserved factors. Improving student achievement by
accomplishing changes in school organizational behavior represents
direct application of x-efficiency.
The analysis in this study draws heavily on the notions of both
technical efficiency and x-efficiency. Both of these lend themselves to
an input/output style of inquiry like the education production function.
This economic model builds on the foundation of the Cobb-Douglas
factors of production theory although the genesis of that theory relates
to industrial not educational formulations.4
Research Design
The goal of this study was to estimate the effects of district efficiency on student achievement in Michigan with the hope that objective analysis might serve to ease progress through the troublesome
political process any transition to an adequacy-based school finance
model will encounter. This study draws upon the methodology used
by Phelps and Addonizio in their 2006 study of school accountability
in Minnesota.5
Michigan does not track student achievement data by individual
teacher or per pupil expenditures by school, only by district. Were per
pupil expenditure available by school, the flow to individual students
would require reliance on assumptions and averages. The unavailability
of test score data by classroom or teacher, combined with the lack
of reliable per pupil expenditure data by school and the abstraction
caused by artificial resource flow assumptions, prompted the study’s
James J. Walters is a Certified Public Accountant and Chief
Financial Officer for a group of private companies. He is also a
part-time instructor in the Master’s of Public Administration
program at Western Michigan University.

Educational Considerations, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2008
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

use of the district as the unit of analysis. District level data for MEAP
(Michigan Educational Assessment Program) scores and per pupil
expenditure came from the State of Michigan website.
The operative version of the theoretical education production function for use in this study appears below:6
Mt = b0 + b1pctenroll + b2avg_t_sal + b3avg_p_tchr + b4avg_isal
+ b5avg_totexp_ntr + u + e
Where
M represents statewide Michigan Education Assessment Program
(MEAP) reading and math scores, stated as the percentage of
students taking the test who achieved at a level meeting state
standards;
pctenroll equals the percentage of students in a district eligible to
receive free or reduced-pric meals under U.S. federal guidelines;
avg_t_sal denotes the average teacher salary in the district;
avg_p_tchr is the average number of pupils per district teacher;
avg_isal is the average per pupil district expenditures related to
instructional salaries;
avg_totexp_ntr controls for total district expenditures per pupil,
net of transportation;
"u" signifies the portion of the residual that does not vary over
time but does vary by district (This can be referred to as the
district fixed effect and is estimated following regression);
"e" signifies the random portion of unobserved, residual, or
unexplained variation.
Analysis of the residuals in the fashion indicated above requires
retrieval of multiple observations for each district over time. This study
includes a balanced panel of observations for districts over four years
starting with the 2001-2002 school year through 2004-2005. The average residual by district was used to proxy for the district fixed effect
in second stage regressions.
Although the model specified above contains no variable for district
size, the regression technique used for this study was weighted by
the full time equivalent student population for each district in each
year. This adjusts for district size and mitigates the lack of constant
variance in the residuals (heteroscedasticity) which represents one of
the basic assumptions underlying linear regression.
Analysis of Data And Results
Data Description
Data were collected from public files available on the websites of the
Michigan Department of Education (MDE) and Center for Educational
Performance and Information (CEPI). Data for the dependent variable
came from MEAP scores maintained by the Office of Educational
Assessment and Accountability (OEAA) of the MDE. The second
file type contained district financial information called Bulletin 1014
administered by the MDE Office of State Aid and School Finance. Data
for student eligibility for federal meal subsidies came from information
contained in the Single Record Student Data base controlled by CEPI. A
file representing various measures of a single element in this database
called Free and Reduced Lunch (FRL) appears on the CEPI website.
Bulletin 1014 files contained the most accurate district count as
verified with the School Code Master file maintained by MDE. The
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number of districts reporting in Bulletin 1014 for the years included in
the panel from 2001-2002 through 2004-2005 school years as follows:
743, 742, 744, and 760. However, only 494 districts reported data for
every field used in the model for every year in the panel. The primary
source for this discrepancy comes from counting each charter school as
a separate district.7 However, several traditional districts were excluded
from the study panel. Some traditional school districts in Michigan
do not offer all twelve grades. For the study, any district that did not
offer either seventh or eighth grade was necessarily eliminated from
the panel. Also, MEAP scores are not reported in the public files for
districts with fewer than ten test-takers in a grade.
Descriptive statistics for the 494 district panel are presented in
Table 1. The summary of the dataset contained in Table 1 represents
the same 494 Michigan school districts observed across four years
for a total of 1,976 observations. The means and standard deviations
reported for each explanatory variable were determined after weighting
each variable by the inverse of variance for the student population.
This technique is useful for observations containing averages. Averages based on the number of observations grow in precision as the
number increases. Weighting provides the means to concede greater
importance to the more precise measurements.8 Weighting considers the variation in the data by student although the unit of analysis
remains aggregated by district.
Preliminary Annual Test Results
A preliminary set of sixteen regressions for all four measures of
student achievement and separately for each of the four years served
several purposes. Review of model specification, fit, and model diagnosis represented the primary motivation. The regressions were weighted
by the student population of each school district as discussed above.
This procedure corrected for the anticipated lack of constant variance in the model error term caused by the wide variance in district
size as measured by the number of students. This heteroscedasticity

represented the principal diagnostic problem related to the underlying
assumptions for least squares regression. The weighting methodology provided significant improvement but did not entirely correct the
problem for all years in the study.9
Analysis of Residuals
Some variation in the student achievement measures from the
regressions referred to above remained unexplained. These residuals
contained the fixed but unobserved effect of the district plus random
error.10 The average residual for each district was used to investigate
systematic achievement above or below that predicted by the explanatory variables in each year. The result was assumed to measure the
extent to which the district benefited from "x-efficiency," or contribution to student achievement not captured by the variables specified
in the model. This estimate of district fixed effect was used as an
explanatory variable in second stage regressions.
This simple averaging method for estimating district fixed effects was
used after several attempts at fixed effects regression models failed to
untangle the high correlation between the explanatory variables and
fixed portion of the residual.11 This correlation also proscribed the use
of random effects or generalized least squares methodology.
Post Estimation Annual Test Results Including Fixed Effects Estimates
The sixteen regression results in Tables 2-5 came from estimating
the same model described, but not presented, for preliminary annual
tests, with one exception. The models estimated here included the
variable determined in the previous section to represent the fixed effect
of each district (avg_resid). This variable represented a relative measure
of each district’s contribution to the percentage of students meeting
or exceeding state standards after controlling for the other predictors.
The residual was averaged for each district using the results of the
preliminary regressions for MEAP math and reading tests in fourth,
seventh, and eighth grades. The results were analytically weighted by

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, 2002–2005
Variables

Observations

Weight

district

1,976

year

Minimum

Maximum

6,438,484

1.010

83,070

1,976

6,438,484

2002

2005

math_gr4_sat

1,976

6,438,484

0.695465

0.143724

0.101

1

read_gr4_sat

1,976

6,438,484

0.741757

0.155611

0.13

1

read_gr7_sat

1,976

6,438,484

0.614158

0.174635

0.124

0.97

math_gr8_sat

1,976

6,438,484

0.572979

0.188827

0.057

1

pctenroll

1,976

6,438,484

0.333412

0.217264

0.02

0.9

avg_t_sal

1,976

6,438,484

54056.33

6903.321

24,547

83,479

avg_p_tchr

1,976

6,438,484

21.73831

2.565409

9

33

avg_isal

1,976

6,438,484

4663.104

585.9229

2,827

7,010

avg_totexp_ntr

1,976

6,438,484

8002.849

1294.894

5,416

15,628
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Std. Dev.
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Table 2
Grade 4 Math Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

-0.465***

-.0473***

-.0495***

-.0502***

[-0.61]

[-0.63]

[-0.70]

[-0.75]

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.017)

(0.017)

-0.000000217

0.000000662

-0.000000596

0.000000939

[-0.010]

[0.033]

[0-0.032]

[0.053]

(0.00000063)

(0.00000059)

(0.00000060)

(0.00000058)

-0.00331**

-0.00490***

-0.00720***

-0.00982***

[-0.054]

[-0.088]

[-0.16]

[-0.22]

(0.0014)

(0.0013)

(0.0014)

(0.0015)

0.0000564***

0.0000366***

0.0000473***

0.0000425***

[0.20]

[0.13]

[0.19]

[0.19]

(0.000011)

(0.0000095)

(0.0000095)

(0.000010)

-0.0000216***

-0.0000177***

0.0000232***

-0.0000277***

[-0.15]

[-0.13]

[-0.20]

[-0.26]

(0.0000044)

(0.0000040)

(0.0000036)

(0.0000039)

1.036***

1.086***

1.125***

1.303***

[0.60]

[0.63]

[0.69]

[0.83]

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.037)

(0.042)

0.907***

0.891***

1.010***

0.983***

[6.92]

[6.81]

[8.22]

[8.30]

(0.034)

(0.029)

(0.031)

(0.036)

Observations (n)

494

494

494

494

R-squared

0.90

0.90

0.89

0.87

pctenroll

avg_t_sal

avg_p_tchr

avg_isal

avg_totexp_ntr

avg_resid

Constant

Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the inverse of variance for each district's student population. Each of
the four tables of regression results presented represents one of the
four measures of student achievement regressed over the independent
variables for all four years included in the study.
The fixed effect variable (avg_resid) was statistically significant
with a positive coefficient for all sixteen regressions. The measure for
socioeconomic status (pctenroll) also remained statistically significant
with a negative coefficient across all sixteen model iterations. A one
percent increase in students eligible for free or reduced meals was
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associated with anywhere from one-third to three quarters of a percent
decrease in the percentage of students achieving state standards on
the MEAP depending on the year and subject matter.
All the district resource variables except teacher salaries (avg_t_sal)
were statistically significant for all of the regression models. The variable for teacher salaries remained statistically insignificant for all except
two regressions. The pupil-teacher ratio (avg_p_tchr) was negative
and statistically significant across all sixteen regressions. Its beta
coefficient, with only one exception, represented the smallest impact
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Table 3
Grade 4 Reading Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

-0.486***

-0.372***

-0.389***

-0.378***

[-0.68]

[-0.63]

[-0.70]

[-0.75]

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.012)

-0.000000261

0.000000919*

-0.000000655

0.000000638

[-0.013]

[-0.058]

[-0.045]

[-0.049]

(0.00000051)

(0.00000054)

(0.00000052)

(0.00000041)

-0.00593**

-0.00474***

-0.00527***

-0.00395***

[-0.10]

[-0.11]

[-0.15]

[-0.12]

(0.0011)

(0.0012)

(0.0012)

(0.0010)

0.0000475***

0.0000696***

0.0000419***

0.0000421***

[0.18]

[0.33]

[0.22]

[0.25]

(0.0000086)

(0.0000087)

(0.0000082)

(0.0000071)

-0.0000302***

-0.0000376***

0.0000282***

-0.0000239***

[-0.22]

[-0.35]

[-0.31]

[-0.30]

(0.0000035)

(0.0000037)

(0.0000031)

(0.0000028)

0.978***

0.905***

0.799***

0.727***

[0.60]

[0.67]

[0.63]

[0.62]

(0.028)

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.030)

0.991***

1.030***

1.084***

1.018***

[8.00]

[10.0]

[11.3]

[11.5]

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.025)

Observations (n)

494

494

494

494

R-squared

0.94

0.89

0.87

0.87

pctenroll

avg_t_sal

avg_p_tchr

avg_isal

avg_totexp_ntr

avg_resid

Constant

Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of the school resources measured. The results for the share of the
budget spent on instructional salaries per student (avg_isal) remained
positive and statistically significant for all sixteen models estimated.
with a relatively larger beta than the pupil-teacher ratio.
Total expenditures prior to transportation expense (avg_totexp_ntr)
explained as much variation in student achievement as the other school
variables with beta coefficients ranging from .15 to .35 standard deviations of the dependent variable. The negative sign on this estimate
might be explained by the higher expenditures necessary in urban
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school districts and the high correlation with instructional salaries.
A primary focus for this study was to analyze the extent to which
school district efficiency explained the observed variation in student
achievement. The difference in the explanatory power of the specified
model after developing a proxy for district efficiency was analyzed by
examining the differences in the R2 results for the regressions without
a measure for district fixed effects and the regressions that include
these measures.12
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Table 4
Grade 7 Reading Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.533***

-0.605***

-0.594***

-0.568***

[-0.73]

[-0.79]

[-0.82]

[-0.91]

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.020)

(0.015)

-0.000000741

-0.000000445

-0.000000516

-0.000000446

[-0.036]

[-0.022]

[-0.027]

[-0.027]

(0.00000063)

(0.00000059)

(0.00000067)

(0.00000052)

-0.00795***

-0.0104***

-0.00482***

-0.00774***

[-0.13]

[-0.19]

[-0.10]

[-0.19]

(0.0014)

(0.0013)

(0.0016)

(0.0013)

0.0000486***

0.0000582***

0.0000713***

0.0000512***

[0.18]

[0.21]

[0.28]

[0.24]

(0.000011)

(0.0000095)

(0.000011)

(0.0000090)

-0.0000356***

-0.0000391***

-0.0000312***

-0.0000313***

[-0.25]

[-0.28]

[-0.26]

[-0.32]

(0.0000044)

(0.0000040)

(0.0000040)

(0.0000035)

0.946***

0.889***

0.984***

0.887***

[0.57]

[0.51]

[0.59]

[0.61]

(0.034)

(0.035)

(0.041)

(0.038)

1.037***

1.115***

0.820***

1.063***

[8.22]

[8.41]

[6.50]

[9.70]

(0.034)

(0.029)

(0.035)

(0.032)

Observations (n)

494

494

494

494

R-squared

0.92

0.93

0.89

0.91

pctenroll

avg_t_sal

avg_p_tchr

avg_isal

avg_totexp_ntr

avg_resid

Constant

Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6 shows that after the inclusion of a proxy for district effect
the explanatory power of the estimated model increases by fifteen
percentage points. The difference in explanatory power remained consistent across all four years in this study. This finding is an important
consideration for any measure of school performance or accountability
policy. In the absence of a direct measure for district effect, school
accountability guidelines may actually only measure student charac-

Educational Considerations, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2008
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

teristics and the distribution of property wealth given the power of
these variables to explain student achievement.13 The knowledge of
what portion of the variation of student achievement is associated
with unobserved district effects combined with the estimates that
indicate both the direction and magnitude (Tables 2-5) of that effect,
offers a good theoretical foundation upon which to build a school
district accountability policy.
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Table 5
Grade 8 Math Scores Post-Estimation WLS Regression Results
School Year
Variables

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.634***

-0.668***

-0.641***

-0.672***

[-0.75]

[-0.76]

[-0.78]

[-0.87]

(0.017)

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.017)

-0.000000121

-0.000000638

-0.000000426

-0.000000119*

[-0.0052]

[-0.027]

[-0.020]

[-0.059]

(0.00000068)

(0.00000075)

(0.00000073)

(0.00000061)

-0.0123***

-0.00937***

-0.0121***

-0.00793***

[-0.18]

[-0.14]

[-0.23]

[-0.16]

(0.0015)

(0.0017)

(0.0017)

(0.0015)

0.0000647***

0.0000528***

0.0000569***

0.0000814***

[0.21]

[0.17]

[0.20]

[0.31]

(0.000012)

(0.000012)

(0.000012)

(0.000011)

-0.0000392***

-0.0000323***

-0.0000441***

-0.0000438***

[-0.24]

[-0.20]

[-0.33]

[-0.36]

(0.0000047)

(0.0000051)

(0.0000044)

(0.0000041)

1.039***

1.119***

1.092***

1.082***

[0.54]

[0.55]

[0.58]

[0.60]

(0.037)

(0.044)

(0.045)

(0.044)

1.112***

1.010***

1.132***

0.982***

[7.67]

[6.60]

[7.96]

[7.23]

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.038)

(0.037)

Observations (n)

494

494

494

494

R-squared

0.93

0.91

0.91

0.91

pctenroll

avg_t_sal

avg_p_tchr

avg_isal

avg_totexp_ntr

avg_resid

Constant

Note: Normalized beta coefficients in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In addition, this procedure supplies an objective measure for use in
assuring the public and political decisionmakers that funding school
districts based on adequacy does not simply reward inefficiency. The
objective measurement of district effects provides the means for adjusting legitimate, educationally based, funding differences among districts
for the excess costs they encounter due to their own inefficiency.
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It is also apparent from Table 6 that district efficiency explains a
larger share of the variance in student achievement for the fourth
grade than for either the seventh or eighth grades. The fourth grade
change is larger for math than for reading. The differences between
math and reading narrow in the higher grades. Unobserved effects, for
example, school culture, communication, goal orientation, and focus
might be more highly associated with early student achievement more
than in later grades.

Educational Considerations
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Table 6
Increased Explanatory Power from District Fixed Effects: R-squared Differences
Table 6.1 R-squared for Preliminary Tests on Reading and Math
School Year

Average

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

read_gr4_sat

0.78

0.70

0.71

0.72

0.73

read_gr7_sat

0.80

0.84

0.75

0.80

0.80

math_gr8_sat

0.82

0.78

0.79

0.80

0.80

Table 6.2 R-squared for Post Estimation Tests on Reading and Math
School Year

Average

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

math_gr4_sat

0.90

0.90

0.89

0.87

0.89

read_gr4_sat

0.94

0.89

0.87

0.87

0.89

read_gr7_sat

0.92

0.93

0.89

0.91

0.91

math_gr8_sat

0.93

0.91

0.91

0.91

0.92

Table 6.3 R-squared Differences
School Year

Average

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

math_gr4_sat

0.19

0.20

0.22

0.26

0.22

read_gr4_sat

0.16

0.19

0.16

0.15

0.17

read_gr7_sat

0.12

0.09

0.14

0.11

0.12

math_gr8_sat

0.11

0.13

0.12

0.11

0.12

Average R-squared
difference

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.15

One implication of the disparity of the association of district
effect with student achievement depending on grade level comes from
separately measuring school accountability or adjusting differential
funding by grade. This type of adjustment would be more achievable
if the data were available to replicate this study for individual school
buildings instead of entire districts.
Conclusions, Implications for Policy, and Further Study
The primary purpose of this study was to test a method for measuring Michigan school district efficiency that could be used to modify a
future statewide school funding model based on adequacy. The latter
would replace. the current resource equity finance system. Besides
production efficiency, the desired indicator also gauges "x-efficiency."
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This concept evaluates organizational and qualitative attributes of
districts not readily observed quantitatively.
The foremost consequence of understanding and measuring the
effect of Michigan school district efficiency on student achievement
comes from its use to modify Michigan school funding. Redistribution
of scarce resources always faces political difficulty and public resistance
from those who would bear the burden of providing the benefit to others. Admittedly, this renders a change to an adequacy based Michigan
school finance formula politically improbable. However, some future
political circumstance, similar to the historical pressure for property
tax reform, could materialize and grant unanticipated prominence
to this presently dormant policy perspective. Some states have only
addressed adequacy of school finance due to actual or threatened
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litigation, usually arising out of fresh interpretations of their constitutional educational clause. One genuine objection to adequacy comes
from the trepidation for rewarding districts experiencing higher costs
precipitated at least partially by factors within their control. The
reported results from this research lay the groundwork for minimizing
this risk. Identifying the variation in student achievement explained by
district effects could help limit funding differences to only the higher
costs unrelated to district efficiency.
A second policy implication arising from this research comes from
its demonstration of the need for better data. Sacrifices were made
regarding the unit of analysis and teacher characteristics precipitated
by insufficient data. While this comment hardly seems unexpected
from a quantitative researcher, it also represents a common problem
for educators across the country, including in Michigan. The need for
the retention, ready access, and analysis of student data remains acute
in most states. Most states do provide paper reports, lagged by several
months, to teachers and administrators regarding student test results.
Only five states provide advanced information systems for students
and teachers plus offer the means to link the two systems.14
Michigan should not allow charter schools to avoid reporting crucial
data through their use of management companies. An argument based
on form that a charter school has no salaries to report cannot be sustained in substance. In essence, the management company pays the
salaries as agent for the charter school board of control. Although part
of the logic behind charters comes from freedom from bureaucracy,
this should not be allowed to interfere with the obligation to demand
performance for the investment of tax dollars. This quirk needs to be
addressed administratively or by legislation. Neither should Michigan
allow bargaining groups or any other special interest to politically prevent the matching of student and teacher performance information.
Previous research has demonstrated that class size reduction has
positive effects for student achievement.15 Some studies reveal diminishing effects for smaller classes.16 Sometimes they report the positive
impact of teacher quality, in addition to the class size measure of
teacher quantity.17 Evidence supporting more cost-effective means of
producing positive effects on student achievement may explain the
current results controlling for district efficiency.18 Perhaps improvements
in teacher quality can be achieved with aggressive financial incentives
to recruit the most qualified and talented people. Organizing learning
with higher paid instructional managers supervising larger groups of
students assisted by less expensive support staff and technology may
leverage teacher resources.
In 2005-2006, Michigan began testing students in contiguous years,
as required by the NCLB Act, during grades three through eight for
math and English language arts. This will provide the opportunity to
measure school performance and efficiency using the student achievement gains accomplished in a single year. It also facilitates the use of
lagged student achievement measures as an explanatory variable. This
helps account for innate ability and student learning prior to the point
of collection for the lagged data. A third enrichment grows out of the
ability to measure a single school. This of course assumes that the data
elements necessary for school level analysis become available. Student
level analysis with linkage to specific classrooms and teachers would
provide both increased methodological validity and overall credibility.
Direct measures of class size and teacher characteristics also represent
improvements. Replication would also be possible using a sample of
districts, or even schools, where data was collected directly from the
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agency and not from the state.
In addition to the need for further quantitative research, only qualitative study will provide the interpretation of what specific attributes
differentiate the districts with positive fixed effects from those that
prove negative. Well documented, thorough, and repetitive observations and interviews at sites with the highest and lowest magnitude
of fixed effect residuals may be necessary.
Guidance for school districts where funding was adjusted downward
as a reflection of inefficiency provides a key ingredient to a school
funding system based on adequacy. Meaningful direction will depend
on the results of the future research, referred to above, that isolates the
elements producing both "x-efficiency" and resource efficiency. Clarity
regarding these components provides an essential element in creating
a financial incentive for improvement. Only cost differences outside
of district control should lead to increased funding. Inefficiencies of
the district, that increase cost, should not be rewarded.
This study established the relationship between district effects and
student achievement. One policy implication includes the adjustment
of district funding by some factor representing the district effect on
student achievement, in order to avoid rewarding inefficiency. The
actual derivation of an adjustment factor for application to Michigan
per pupil school funding represents the seeds for future study. This
work should address the limitations previously discussed, especially
regarding data quality and more complete measures for student achievement. It should also provide detailed guidance regarding the range of
choices and qualitative elements of district efficiency.
Regardless of the actual formula chosen, the care, transparency, and
thoroughness of the process for its creation and implementation will
help determine utility for transitioning to an adequacy-based school
finance system in Michigan. The evidence presented here regarding the
relationship between district effects and student achievement provides
an introductory, but significant, contribution to this Michigan school
finance policy arena.
Endnotes
James Phelps and Michael Addonizio, "How Much Do Schools and
Districts Matter? A Production Function Approach to School Accountability" Educational Considerations 33 (Spring 2006): 51-62, 30.

1

Henry M Levin, "Raising School Productivity: An X-Efficiency
Approach," The American Economic Review 16 (June 1997): 303-11.

2

Harvey Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency,’"
The American Economic Review 56 (June 1966): 392-415.
3

Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas, "A Theory of Production,"
The American Economic Review 18 (March 1928): 139-65.

4

Phelps and Addonizio, "How Much Do Schools and Districts
Matter?”

5

6

The equation attempts to follow that of Phelps and Addonizio as
closely as possible given available data. See Phelps and Addonizio,
53.
Charter schools are public schools with a charter from one of the
allowable organizations under state law and operate independently
from the traditional local public school board in their jurisdiction.
Since many of these schools are actually operated by management
companies contracted by their board of control, they do not technically have or report any salary information on Bulletin 1014. Based on

7

Educational Considerations
8

Walters: Funding Michigan K-12 Adequacy Without Rewarding Inefficiency
the full time equivalency pupil count data maintained by CEPI, the
number of charter schools for each of the years in the panel was 185,
185, 192, and 210 respectively.
UCLA Academic Technology Services, "Stata Frequently Asked
Questions: What Type of Weights Do SAS, Stata, and SPSS Support?”
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/Stata/faq/weights.htm.
8

Tables are omitted in the interest of brevity but are available from
the author.

9

Phelps and Addonizio, "How Much Do Schools and Districts Matter?”
10

11

Ibid.

12

This technique follows the analysis of Phelps and Addonizio.

13

Ibid.

David J. Hoff, "Technology Counts: Delving Into Data," Education
Week, 2006 25 (May 4 2006), 12.
14

Ronald Ferguson, "Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on
How and Why Money Matters," Harvard Journal on Legislation 28
(May 1991): 465-98; Larry Hedges, Richard Laine, and Rob Greenwald,
"Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of
Differential School Inputs and Student Outcomes," Educational
Researcher 23 (May 1994): 5-14; Barbara Nye, Larry G. Hedges, and
Spyros Konstantopoulos, "The Long-Term Effects of Small Class Sizes:
A Five-Year Follow-up of the Tennessee Class Size Experiment," Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 21 (Summer 1999): 127-42;
Gary Peevely, Larry Hedges, and Barbara Nye, "The Relationship of
Class Size Effects and Teacher Salary," Journal of Education Finance
31 (Summer 2005): 101-09.

15

16

Ferguson, "Paying for Public Education.”

Peevely et al., "The Relationship of Class Size Effects and Teacher
Salary."
17

Lynn Ilon and Anthony H Normore, "Relative Cost Effectiveness of
School Resources in Improving Achievement," Journal of Education
Finance 31 (Winter 2006): 238-54.
18

Educational Considerations, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2008
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017

49
9

